北京师范大学首都教育经济研究院

[学术午餐会]Teaching to the Tails: Teacher Performance Pay and the Distribution of Student Achievement
发布日期: 2014-10-09

 
讲座时间101512:30-14:00
讲座地点:科技楼C311
讲座摘要:
In developing countries, educational systems are often designed to serve the elite. This can be true not only at the institutional level, but also within classrooms. Singular focus on competitive entrance examinations leads teachers—even in early grades—to focus on the best students at the expense of those perceived as having less potential. Performance pay schemes, as they are commonly designed, can exacerbate inequality in outcomes by strengthening incentives further for teachers to focus on students with the most potential. In this paper, we present the results from a randomized evaluation designed to test the impact of teacher performance pay (which is increasingly used to address weak incentives facing educators in developing countries) on not only the level, but also the distribution of gains in student achievement. Teachers across 214 schools were randomly assigned to one of three incentive groups or a control group. In the first incentive group (“levels”), teachers were rewarded based on levels of student achievement measured by student scores on year-end standardized exams. In the second group (“gains”), teachers were rewarded based on average gains in student achievement over the course of one school year. In the third incentive group (“pay-for-percentile”), teachers were offered an incentive scheme designed explicitly to allocate teacher effort equally across all students in the class, regardless of baseline achievement (based on the pay-for-percentile scheme proposed by Berlevy and Neal, 2012). Our results show that: (a) “pay for percentile” incentives improve overall student achievement more than incentives tied to achievement levels or achievement gains; (b) “pay for percentile” incentives have the greatest impact on low-achieving students; (c) the achievement distribution of students whose teachers receive “pay for percentile” incentives align with teachers’ a priori expectations for how much they can improve student achievement.
 
个人简介:
刘承芳,女,侗族,现任中国科学院农业政策研究中心副研究员。2008年获美国加州大学农业与资源经济博士学位。
主要从事统筹城乡协调发展中的农村教育、农村儿童健康等农村公共服务方面的提供、管理与政策研究。主持过国家自然科学基金面上项目和青年项目,教育部留学回国人员科研启动基金项目,以及国际影响评估基金项目(3IE)等项目。目前已在国内外期刊发表论文50多篇,其中一半以上是在国际学术期刊发表的SSCI论文。

 

北京师范大学首都教育经济研究院
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